Under the theoretical framework of
international trade political economy, this paper examines whether interest
groups can dominate the voting of the US Exchange Rate Manipulation Act in 2015
from the perspective of RMB appreciation. Taking 100 senators as samples, this
paper makes model estimation by using Full Information Maximum Likelihood
Method (FIML), and quantitatively investigates the deep-seated driving factors
behind the voting results of the US Exchange Rate Manipulation Act. The
empirical results show that the influence of political donations from different
interest groups on the voting behavior of parliamentarians is different. The
political donations from American labor organization significantly affect the
voting behavior of parliamentarians, but business groups and ideological
organizations do not play a significant role in the voting results. In
addition, senators’ personal characteristics affect the political donation of
the bill to a certain extent, but do not affect the voting results. In the
future, China needs to continuously pay attention to the latest progress of US
exchange rate policy, correctly evaluate its impact on China’s economy, and
maintain communication and coordination with important US interest groups to
reduce the negative impact on related industries in China.
JEL classification numbers: F14, F50, F31.
Keywords: RMB Appreciation, Trade Protection, Bills Voting, Political
Donation, Interest Group.