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Abstract
This paper exploits China’s Graduated Dividend Tax (GDT) policy as
a quasi-natural experiment and applies a difference-in-differences approach to
examine the effect of dividend tax adjustments on firms’ investment efficiency.
The results show that the policy improves investment efficiency, mainly by
curbing overinvestment. Mechanism analyses indicate that the GDT policy
operates by increasing individual investors’ patience and improving corporate
governance, including reducing information asymmetry. Heterogeneity analyses
further show that the effects are more pronounced for highly leveraged firms
with more frequent shareholder meetings. Overall, the results suggest that the
GDT policy improves firms’ investment efficiency by strengthening corporate
governance and curbing overinvestment.
JEL classification numbers: G32, G34, D22.
Keywords: GDT policy, Investment efficiency, Long-term
shareholding; Corporate governance.