We present a detailed synthesis of previous studies on general meeting (U.S.A, U.K, Japan, Canada…). At the empirical level, our study should permit to identify general assemblies French characteristics (verification of the application of Mansion rapport on SBF 120). We will try to present the explanatory variables that influence voting in French general meeting. We will examine whether the current literature on shareholder voting in the U.S. can be used as a broad indication of shareholder voting support in France. An analysis of 102 French general meeting in the period 2004-2006 shows that institutional investors are not significantly related to the likelihood of votes against a proposal. We also include the stock ownership of the outside shareholder in our model. We find that this has a positive influence on the likelihood of votes against a proposal. The proposal to authorize the management board to issue new shares and to limit or exclude preemptive rights is more likely to be voted against than other proposals. We add the performance variables. We find that firms with valuable growth opportunities, as reflected in a higher market-to book ratio, have a lower probability of votes against a proposal at the general meeting.