

The implications of Governance on the relationship between Investment Incentives and Business Valence

Seth O. Giriago¹, Nixon O. Omoro¹ and Joshua O. Wanjare¹

Abstract

This paper's theme was to explore the implications of governance on the relationship between investment incentives and business valence. The paper equally dealt with overview on the connectivity between the study variables. The empirical literature review presents a suggestion that governance is a complex concept which is involved in the relationship between investment incentives and business valence. While connectivity between investment incentives and business valence is relative, it is variously accounted to different forms of investment incentives that avail divergent and fairly unpredictable levels of appeal. Investors exuding high expectations are very keen on governance impacts on investment possibilities. Investment incentives and governance bear clear connectivity because actualization of investment incentives is the preserve of governance. The three variables under study, display a peculiar interconnectivity in which they build on and reinforce each other. There is gap in succinct relationship between the three variables because the links among them remains a logical coincidence. This becomes complicated with the fact that these variables manifest themselves in multiple directions and forms. There is also no clear confirmation between mediator and predictor level of influence on the outcome of investors' perceived value.

Keywords: Governance, Investment incentives, Business Valence.

¹ Department of Finance and Accounting, University of Nairobi, Kenya.

1. Introduction

This study evaluates whether governance is a fundamental determinant on the relationship between investment incentives and the business valence. This type of understanding is of great importance to the achievement of business objectives (Gabriel, 2018). Investment incentives are defined by Bellak and Leibrecht (2016) as government provisions that lead to money-valued advantages to investors. They influence the size, location, investors involvement and growth of particular projects by affecting investment relative cost or by altering the risk attached to the investment. There are various forms of investment incentives, the financial incentives include grants, loans and no or low interest financing. While, fiscal incentives include tax credits, tax abatements or tax revenue sharing (Bakertilly, 2017). Others like regulatory incentives, cover subsidized infrastructure, free land, regulatory concessions and relaxation of law and ad hoc exceptions. Business valence as used in the study is a value assigned to an investment, transaction or other economic outcome that relates to scale. According to Ronald and Lawrence (2015), the valence of any subject matter is the positivity or the negativity revealed by the review by its experienced customers. Consumers while being influenced by conclusions, inferences or connections over goods and services, will always portray emotional charge towards what they consume. The perceptions can either be of positive or negative valence depending on measurable standards and goals. Business valence is measured and stated in continuum terms of valence score of the word under consideration by means of observation and experiences rather than pure logic (Swarnkar, 2020). Lee (2003) defines governance as an institution of social coordination. It can also be described as a means of nurturing perpetual growth and trust in business, contributing to more inclusive societies. The concept is wide and vaguely encompassing many versions in terms of how governance is organized and exercised. The diversity in governance nonetheless, shares one important common feature, they are all ascribing to the rule of law, which provides for rights and responsibilities of participants with common social concerns (Lynn et al. 2001).

2. Literature Review

The goal of the literature review is to survey available scholarly sources on governance, investment incentives and business valence and to compare their interconnectivity and relevant implications.

2.1 Investment Incentives and Business Valence

Factors that nourish industrial classification were clustered by Larsson and Venkatesh (2010) and the weight of government incentives relative to the economic fundamentals in the investment of software sector in Thailand by interviews of investors. The study proved that economic fundamentals were perceived as more important than government incentives in inducing investor decisions. Miroslava (2013) did a study to find out the effectiveness of investment incentives in foreign companies located in the Czech Republic relative to not only the local organizations

but for the government as a provider who should receive inputs in terms of taxes and other yields. It was concluded from the analyzed results that it was largely effective to provide investment incentives. Ondabu (2015) in efforts to bring to table the debate whether investment incentives are serving as gifts or motivators and also looked at the moderating effects of investors' perception on stock market performance, used exploratory research design. The study found that the effect of investor perception on stock market performance outweighs that of incentives. The study found that information had an important place in pricing efficiency and market confidence as investors' incentives remain relevant in the ideal world while investors' perceptions remain relevant in real world. The study concluded that investment incentives are mere gifts as opposed to being motivators towards investment decisions. Udoudoh (2016), in the case of Uyo Metropolis, Nigeria, examined the various forms of investment available to real estate investors in Nigeria and expected investment quality that is attractive to the investors. The study applied 200 questionnaires to gather data. It was revealed that investment risk encountered depended majorly upon investment certification, access to finance and rent default. The study thus recommended that managers and investors should innovate strategies to mitigate risk and to enhance investment opportunities. Ondabu (2017) partly aimed at determining the moderating effect of investor's perception on the relationship between stock market incentives and performance for listed in NSE. The study utilized descriptive design and stratified and systematic random sampling to arrive at 30 listed firms out 60. The study revealed that investors' perceptions have strong moderating effect on all incentives. Gitonga (2017) embarked on determining the relationship between tax incentives and foreign development investment inflows of multinational corporations in Kenya. The study employed regression analysis on secondary data gathered cross sectionally between 1995 and 2015. The study showed a positive relationship between wear and tear allowance and FDI inflows. Investment deductions and industrial buildings allowances showed no significant relationships with DFI. Schwaiger et al. (2019) studied the expectation and satisfaction levels of financial experts and students. They experimented 150 experts and 576 students by a systematic variation of the price according to the ending positive or negative return and by alternating between the upswing and the downswing manner by which the end return is arrived at. The study showed that experts display the most optimistic price expectations and are highly satisfied when prices decline before recovery. Experts also display higher price expectations following positive returns. Quantitative correlations were observed among the students however expert price expectations do not suffer framing effects. In a study to provide evidence on the particular investment risks perceived by the Chinese investors, specifically in relation to; ownership structure, foreign investment motive and institutional quality. Ullah et al. (2019) discovered that ownership structure is significant in demonstrating the varying risk perceptions among the Chinese organizations. Privately owned organizations perceive lower risks as opposed to public organizations and resource seeking and market seeking foreign direct investors

perceive higher risks in oversea destinations. It was further discovered that quality of institutions in foreign lands is key in modelling the perceived exposure to risk. Governments with strong judicial systems have perceived lower risks regarding security and integrity issues. Judicial effectiveness in the western countries by implication offer greater incentive for pursuance of investment goals. The sum of these revelations is that Chinese public organizations access more support and resources than their private counterparts thus the latter are reverting to foreign lands as alternate, conducive expansion points. Ravšelj and Aristovnik (2020) got concerned that investment in private R&D is usually socially unattractive depending on market failure, such as positive externalities, information asymmetry uncertainty and risk. They accordingly delved in finding the effect of public R&D policy on R&D business through the application of panel data regression analysis on observations made between 2012 and 2016 on 3,113 organizations. The empirical findings indicated that R&D subsidies are ineffective as they dislodge organizations own expenditure but become only effective if applied together with R&D tax incentives to growing organization. The findings also indicate that R&D tax incentives are usually effective when organizations have strong tax base. The implication of the findings is that R&D tax incentives are more attractive than subsidies in Slovenia, but are nonetheless attractive particularly to in fact organization with weaker tax base. Lebreton, et al. (2019) obtained data from four experiments where objects did various forms of confidence elicitation tasks. The study investigated the effect of incentive motivation on confidence accuracy by combining a continuum task with a confidence incentivization technique. The weight and valence of monetary incentives were varied to orthogonalize their motivational and effective compositions while confirming theories on rational decision-making and motivation. The experiments confirmed that decisions go along with feelings of confidence, a belief about the decision being made. Confidence accuracy is crucial especially in tenacious decisions involving money and improves according to the money-value accorded to the motivational incentive.

2.2 Investment Incentives and Governance

A study by Mooya (2009), in the property investment processes, discovered that expert judgment is only useful when actual market information is not available. He explains that experts are sagacious enough in markets where they don't form part of the underlying information. The decision itself is made at two levels: the strategic level, focusing on the selection of investment media, and the tactical level that involves the selection and management of individual properties. Ichim (2009) did a study on local budget process and local economic development in Romania and revealed that local authorities deploy in designing and actualizing local budgets a variety of financial instruments. The main investment drivers with direct impact on local development were found to be; tax incentives, European funding programs, business incubators and leverage in relation to utilization or property and land ownership. The study observed that local administrations collect budget revenues, the basis upon which provision of public services to the people even by third parties

is dependent. It also realized that good local public services provide and sustain a pleasant environment for the area citizens and businesses to enable them to grow and attract other investment agents by setting out plans and strategies that create new job and increase income. Literature gives credit to Gavriletea and Gavriletea (2009) for researching on the investment problems for producing energy from renewable sources (E-RES) in Romania. The study used SWOT analysis and noted that, production of energy from renewable sources was a market with enormous potential and with high investment costs. The analysis reveals that Romania has multiple opportunities to achieve E-RES if legislative framework can support obtainable grants. It also reveals that capital markets represent the solution for attracting capital supply needed in the industry and observes that positive climate adjustments may modify investor perceptions in the capital market. The study recommended that politics that should be adopted by broader governance to incentivize investment in the area of E-RES, may need to pay attention to allocation of financial inducements to organization that embark on reduction of emissions. This may be augmented by exempting investors in the capital market, who participate in E-RES sector from certain taxes. Alleviation of non-economic barriers negotiated among governments is also important for instance ease to access of subsidized prices to electrical networks.

The research by Rodrik (2014), on a project titled “Green industrial policy,” ventured to prove that the policy can be improved by designs that combat informational and political risks. The study reviewed several empirical works and concluded that policy instruments should provide for collaboration between government and the private sector to reach at diagnosis on impediments on innovative economics and solutions. Njuru et al., (2014), conducted a literature review on the impact of government expenditure on private investment in Kenya. The study revealed that government expenditure, either recurrent or development had positive effect on private investment. Literature provides that Pastorella (2016) investigated the reasons why technical governance are appointed in Europe. The study conceptualized the characteristics of technical governance and compared them with those in political-party governance. The study found that when political actors delegate power to technical appointees, their political interests are put aside and they give up on policy. Kusek and Silva (2018), interviewed 754 executives in exploring the perspectives and decision making across all the stages of investment cycle. The study found that political stability and business friendly regulatory environment are the top two factors motivating multinational investment decisions in developing nations. Investors search for predictability, transparency and efficiency in the conduct of public governance and the smaller the size of the investing entity the severe the sensitivity to the investment incentive. Njiru et al., (2020), adopted the error correction model for elimination and used ordinary least squares to execute regression analysis in examining the effect of government infrastructure development on economic growth in Kenya. The study concluded that, while economic infrastructure had positive effect, social infrastructure investment was indicating negative and insignificant effect on economic growth.

2.3 Business Valence and Governance

In a study where Nedelchev (2012) took the task of reviewing corporate governance by evaluating contrasting perspectives between convergence and divergence in corporate governance. The review discovered that convergence between sectors outplays convergence between countries and Functional convergence outdistances formal convergence. The study analysis shows that dilemma between convergence and divergence is determined by investors who bring up their perceptions and expectations in respect to ownership protection and investment rights. Governance converges with respect to accountability to investors and for transparency to investors but divergence occurs in terms of governance structure and composition. Bell and Aguilera (2014) utilized a theoretical path to illustrate how different combinations of observations and incentive-based governance modes lead to similar amount of investor assessment of organizations. They also presupposed that institutional dimensions associated with minority shareholder protection ability in the foreign IPO's home country represent a boundary requirement that affects the number of governance patterns capable to achieve U.S. Investors' high value perception. The study found that foreign IPO firms can derive legitimate acceptance among the U.S. investors by applying different combinations of governance practices. This process is however immersed in a wider institutional framework that considers the home institutional environment subject to business uniqueness. Lai and Chen (2014), investigated the investors' perception on the value of governance with the proposition that when information of scandals flows into the market, certain investors alter their business behaviours to non-scandalous portfolios. This was after the unearthing of scandalous practices in the Taiwan market between June 16, and September 15, 2004. It was discovered that a good number of investors stopped trading during the time of the scandal even with organizations whose governance was not involved in the scandals. It was also discovered that small individual investors could reenter the market albeit inertly and recorded underperformance. International investors and larger individual investors reentered the market assertively while aiming for assets in organizations with heavy cash- flows and with attractive portfolio outcomes.

Niehaves and Plattfaut (2015) applied quantitative study of 357 local governments and used a perspective of governance theory for elaborate awareness of what impacts on collaboration. Even with increased maturity in process innovation, every collaborative mode, either hierarchy, network or market gains importance. The study found that under financial stress, governance tend to shift to network partnership with other decentralized governments while lack of process management knowledge leads to market mode of collaboration with consultants. Stepanova and Ivantsova (2015), aimed at comparing market perception of good or bad governance in a bank with an actual impact corporate governance have on the bank's fundamental value. The duo sampled 470 public banks in America and Europe during 2010 to 2012 and took analysis whether it was worth investing money in corporate governance and if that was less important from investors view

point. The study shows that the size and the independence of the board are not linearly correlated to market perception however small efficient boards or large boards composed of knowledgeable and experienced members are attractive. There is evidence that investors holding high risk assets are more involved in bank's business and watch its governance closely resulting to positive investor attitude. The study generally proved that financial position of the banks is of no effect on investors' perception as compared to organizational governance. This is attributed to the difficulty with which investors acquire data on governance for incorporation in investment decision. In a study where Malathy and Saranya (2017) investigated on factors influencing investors' perception towards stock market decision, descriptive design was used and data from a sample of 75 respondents was collected through a structured questionnaire. The study revealed that investors' perceptions are influenced by share price, investment returns, market risk, dividend policy, organizational reputation, governance reputation and related expert views. Buchanan (2017) took a phenomenological study to link the effects of governance disclosure with confidence and decision-making trends of non-institutional accredited investors. The study embraced the conceptual framework of Akerlof's information theory and Verstege Ryan and Buchholtz's trust/risk decision making model. Interview data from a sample of 21 respondents indicated epistemological patterns confirming the harmful effects of asymmetrical information on investors' decision making and trust behaviour. Yang et al. (2020), used descriptive and regression analysis on Chinese firms listed in 2015 and 2016, to explore the connection between board informal hierarchy and corporate governance efficiency with the psychological perception as the mediator, it was found that a stronger board informal hierarchy is better for governance efficiency with full mediation by psychological perception.

2.4 Synthesis of key studies and knowledge gaps

Empirical evidence on the implications of Governance on the relationship between investment incentives and business valence indicated variant views from the literature review. A number of the studies under review applied governance as a moderator in relationships implicating any of the other two variables. Thorough review tends to indicate lack of consensus on which variable, between governance and business valence is predicting or responding to the other in a continuum. There seem to be consensus in the existing literature on fundamental role of collaborative governance in formulating relevant policies and more so investment incentives. There is no clarity whether wealth creation and economic growth are assured if experts are fully in charge. available literature, is however clear that investors are interested in simplicity and not complexity and confusion. The extant empirical works agree that, smaller investors exhibit severe sensitivity to the investment incentives and to matters of integrity but bears no consensus on the role, effect or importance on provision of investment incentives. Majority of the studies have only two variables with no mediating or moderating variables. There is gap in succinct

relation between the three study variables as any tie within or among them remains a logical coincidence. The current empirical review reveals application of multiple study designs and statistical techniques involving both secondary data achievable largely through literature review and primary data obtainable through questionnaire survey conducted in the developed world except for a few instances. The current review contends that, much more distinct investigations in this objective area remain pending.

3. Conclusion and Recommendations

3.1 Conclusion

From literature that the study reviewed, it can be concluded that governance has certain involvement in the relationship between investment incentives and business valence. There is evidence that governance has a moderating role on the business valence of investment incentives. It can however be implied from expectancy theory that governance plays intervening effect on perceived value of the investment incentives which in turn impact business outcomes. Investors rely on both social and financial signals in making economic determinations in a world where investment incentives are valence oriented, as key influencers of market perceptions and preferences on governance traits. It is also discovered that investors' feelings may influence decisions made by governance which on the other hand can take actions that pose either positive or negative effects on external perceptions. It is therefore worth observing that the three variables within this study, have a peculiar interconnectivity in which they build on and reinforce each other.

Connectivity between investment incentives and business valence is relative. Generally, this is because various forms of investment incentives avail divergent levels of appeal to the present-day investors. It is held that strong legal systems, security and integrity happen to be greater incentives to resource and market seeking foreign investors whose decision-making processes derive more from own perception than from provisions of investment incentives. It is also true that investor decisions intensify and relate with investors' feelings, confidence and beliefs on matters involving money and the value accorded to the motivator. Expert investors tend to express higher expectations and optimism over price fluctuations while private firms perceive lower risks and public firms perceive higher risks. Investment frameworks vary widely across the world, with jurisdictions that have tighter regulations being critical of those with liberal tendencies towards investment incentives. Fiscal incentives are more common in developing countries especially those with rudimentary fluidity of regulatory frameworks. Comparatively, financial incentives are more popular in the developed part of the globe. It is argued that some investment risks depend on accessibility to financial incentives and that fiscal incentives like tax are more attractive than financial incentives to infant firms that can however be effectively nourished from a combination of the two incentive forms. It is thus accurate to conclude that the investors' motivational force is the product of total expectations for the outcome and their related business valence.

Indeed, business valence is central to the state and direction of investment anywhere, any time.

Investment incentives and Governance are found to be clearly connected. Governance is responsible for the diagnosis and innovative processes culminating to enacting and actualizing investment incentives. Investors focus a lot on governance commitment to prudent financial management and the policy instruments applied in ensuring predictability, transparency and efficiency in governance. These can be provided for through a collaborative effort between public and the private sector in economic development. Investment incentives can be classified as either economic fundamentals such as coincidental geographical and climatic benefits in a country or intentional government incentives such as long-term statutory provisions or operational regulations and policies. Political stability and business friendly regulations are the top two factors motivating international investment, economic infrastructure and skilled labour also pose positive effects while social infrastructure happen to record insignificant attention from investors. Smaller investors exhibit severe sensitivity to the investment incentives, in addition markets with potential and heavy investment costs may require enabling legislation for obtainable grants and special prices to investors in their important stages of growth.

The study finds a symbiotic connectivity between business valence and governance. Recognition of business valence, be it the positivity or negativity exhibited by investors, can affect the practice, pattern or quality of governance. In other words, business valence can induce organizational culture, values and behavior. Inversely analyzed, application of different combinations of governance structures can shape the level and value of perception among investors. While board size is irrelevant to investors, knowledgeable and experienced board members are very attractive to investors. The study realizes that governance adapts market-based mode due to managerial knowledge gaps derivable from expert consultants but shifts to network mode to maneuver financial challenges. It is tempting to conclude that investors' emotions rely on expert judgment only if market information is unavailable. Nonetheless investors' legitimate acceptance depends on governance reputation, but investors trust and decisions can suffer from asymmetrical information with smaller investors being very sensitive in trading in scandalous markets while big and or international investors portrayed more attraction towards securities which exhibiting heavy cash-flows.

3.2 Recommendations

This study proposes a governance mechanism that incorporates divergent skills and believes from different stakeholders, which may fit well with various investor values, interests and expectations. It is important that governance is composed of informed members capable of demonstrating competence to the investors. Further, organizations both public and private should abandon discretionary and long-term investment incentives as their mechanisms for motivating investors and instead shift to the principle of exceptional investment incentives only for unusual circumstances.

3.3 Further Research

This study suggests further research that applies the dynamics of real-life context, preferably a developing country with support from theory, to confirm and exert the exact place of governance in the relationship between investment incentives and business valence.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Appreciations go to my class mates, O. William, A. Daniel and E. Grace.

References

- [1] Bakertilly. (2017). Why do government provide incentives?
<https://www.bakertilly.com/insights/why-do-governments-provide-incentives>
- [2] Bell, R. G., Filatotchev, I. and Aguilera, R. V. (2014). Governance and investors' perceptions of foreign IPO value: an institutional perspective.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2011.0146>
- [3] Bellak, C. and Leibrecht, M. (2016). The Use of Investment Incentives: The Cases of R&D Related Incentives and International Investment Agreement.
DOI:10.7312/tava17298-005
- [4] Bitzenis, A. (2003). Did financial incentives Affect Foreign Direct Investment inflows in Bulgaria? *South Eastern Europe Journal of Economics*, (1) 65 - 84.
- [5] Buchanan, J. (2017). Corporate Governance and the Shareholder: Asymmetry, Confidence, and Decision-Making.
www.walden.edu. <https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations>
- [6] Gabriel, J. M. O. (2018). Business management: An indigenous standpoint. Nigeria: University of Port Harcourt Press.
- [7] Gavriletea, M. and Gavriletea, M. (2009). The investment problematic for producing energy from renewable sources in Romania. Finance and economic stability in the context of financial crisis (pp. 496-503). Romania: SIF Banat-Crişana.
- [8] Gitonga, F. K. (2017). Retrieved from the relationship between tax incentives and foreign development investment inflows of Multinational Corporation in Kenya. PhD Thesis. University of Nairobi.
[https://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/102707?show=full#:~:text=The%20relationship%20between%20tax%20incentives,1995%2D2015\)%20was%20collected.](https://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/102707?show=full#:~:text=The%20relationship%20between%20tax%20incentives,1995%2D2015)%20was%20collected.)
- [9] Ichim, C. (2009). Local budget process and local economic development. Finance and economic stability in the context of financial crisis (pp. 140-141). Romania: SIF Banat-Crişana.
- [10] IMF (2019). Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy.
<https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498302197.007>
- [11] Larsson, C. and Venkatesh, S. (2010). The Importance of Government Incentives Relative to Economic Fundamentals. *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, 27 (3) 312 - 329.

- [12] Lebreton, M., Bacily, K., Palminteri, S. and Engelmann, J. B. (2019). Contextual influence on confidence judgments in human reinforcement learning. *PLOS Computational Biology*, 15(4), e1006973. doi.org.
- [13] Lee, N. (2003). Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. The Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference. Bloomington, Indiana, USA: Indiana University.
- [14] Lai, H. J. and Chen, L. (2014). The valuation effect of corporate governance on stakeholder wealth: Evidence from strategic alliances. *International Review of Economics & Finance*, 32, 117-131.
- [15] Lynn, J. L. Heinrich, C.J. and Hill, H. C. (2001). *Improving Governance: A New Logic for Empirical Research*. Washington. D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- [16] Malathy., M. and Saranya, J. (2017). A study on factors influencing investors' perception towards stock market decision. *International Journal of Management and Business Studies (IJMBS)*, 7(3), 22-26.
- [17] Miroslava, C. (2013). The Effectiveness of Investment Incentives in Certain Foreign Companies Operating in the Czech Republic. *Journal of Competitiveness*, 5 (1) 108-120.
- [18] Mooya, M. (2009). Market value without a market: Perspectives from transaction cost theory. *Urban Studies*, 687-701.
- [19] Nedelchev, M. (2012). Corporate governance of financial intermediaries: Convergence and Divergence. University of Veliko Turnovo, 2012 Academic Conference. Retrieved from Corporate governance of financial intermediaries: Convergence and Divergence. Retrieved from University of Veliko Turnovo, 2012 Academic Conference:
https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/64545/1/MPPA_paper_64545.pdf.
- [20] Niehaves, B. and Plattfaut, R. (2015). *Market, Network, Hierarchy: Emerging Mechanisms of Milnster*. Germany: European Research Center for Information.
- [21] Njiru, E., Simiyu, J. and Bunde, A. (2020). Effect of Government Infrastructure Investment on Economic Growth in Kenya. *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*. Vol.11, No.4. DOI: 10.7176/JESD/11-4-09
- [22] Njuru, S., Ombuki, C., Wawire, N. and Okeri, S. (2014). Impact of government expenditure on private investment in Kenya. *Journal of Economics*, 2(8), pp.1-20. <https://researchjournali.com/view.php?id=900>
- [23] Ondabu, I. T., Willy, M. and Sifunjo, K. (2015). Stock market investment incentives: A gift or a motivator? Evidence from literature. *Business Management and Economics Research*, 1(5), 54-62
- [24] Ondabu, I. T. (2017). Effect of investment incentives on stock market performance: Survey of firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange. Retrieved from Hanle.net: <http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/3065>
- [25] Pastorella, G. (2016). Retrieved from *Technocratic Governments: Power, Expertise and Crisis Politics in European Democracies*:
http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3364/1/Pastorella_Technocratic_Governments.pdf

- [26] Peter, Kusek and Silva, A. A. (2018). Retrieved from What investors want: Perceptions and Experiences of multinational corporations in developing countries: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3152086
- [27] Ravšelj, D. and Aristovnik, A. (2020). The Impact of Public R&D Subsidies and Tax Incentives. *International Journal of Economics and Business Administration*, 8 (1) 60-179.
- [28] Rodrik, D. (2014). Green Industrial Policy. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 30 (3) 469-491.
- [29] Ronald, L. H. and Lawrence, R. (2015). The influence of the source and valence of word-of-mouth information on post failure and post recovery evaluation: <http://doi.org/10.1007/s11628-015-0272-3>
- [30] Schwaiger, R., Kirchler, M., Lindner, F. and Weitzel, U. (2019). www.elsevier.com/locate/jed. Determinants of investor expectations and satisfaction. A study with financial professionals. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 110, p. 103677.
- [31] Stepanova, A. and Ivantsova, O. (2015). Market perception: Is corporate governance an important signal for investors? Evidence from the banking sector. Higher School of Economics. hse.ru
- [32] Swarnkar, N. (2020). SWARNKAR, N., 2020. VADER Sentiment Analysis in Algorithmic Trading. [online]. QuantInsti Blog. Available from: quantinsti.com. <https://blog.quantinsti.com/vader-sentiment/>
- [33] Udoudoh, F. P. (2016). Evaluation of Risk Elements in Real Estate investment In Nigeria: The Case of Uyo Metropolis, Akwa Ibom State. *Real Estate*, 18 (10) 7.
- [34] Ullah, S. W. and Xiao, W. (2019). Risk Perceptions and Risk Management Approaches of Chinese Overseas. *Elsevier*, 47 (c) 470-486.
- [35] Yang, G., Gao, Y., Liang, W. and Zhao, J. (2020). Influence of board informal hierarchy on corporate governance efficiency: an analysis based on psychological perception. *Revista Argentina de Clínica Psicológica*, 50-57., 50-57.