# Do Female Fund Managers outperform their Male Counterparts? <br> A Quantitative Analysis of UK Retail Funds 

Jacob H Schmidt PhD ${ }^{1}$ and Bianca Hutton Chimes ${ }^{2}$


#### Abstract

Why are there so few women in finance and even fewer managing funds? There is a major discrepancy between the number of female and male fund managers worldwide. The aim of this paper is to ascertain if gender is a contributing factor to fund managers' performance. This is examined through analysis of data from 20122022 attained from eight major IA sectors of funds (Asian, European, North American, UK All Companies and UK Income equity funds; Targeted Absolute Return, Sterling Corporate Bond and 40-85 Sector funds) which are available to UK retail investors. This paper aims to compare the performance of all funds in the data pool with funds that involve one or more female managers through a quantitative and qualitative analysis. There is no significant research on the performance of women fund managers for UK investors. The authors intend to fill this gap with this paper. We find that funds managed by women or mixed teams produce similar and sometimes better risk-adjusted returns than male-only managed funds but are few in numbers and find it difficult to raise significant amounts of assets.


JEL classification numbers: D61, G11, G14, J16, M14.
Keywords: Gender, Investment, Asset Management, Wealth, Diversity.

[^0]
## 1. Introduction

Why are there so few women in finance and even fewer managing funds? There is a major discrepancy between the number of female and male fund managers worldwide. A magnitude of contributors could elucidate the low percentage of women in the field such as career interruptions (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2010), hiring discrimination against females (Goldin and Rouse, 2000), customer discrimination by propensity to invest in male over female managers (Becker, 1971) and self-selection by females to go into other fields (Polachek, 1981). The Citywire Alpha Female 2020 Report suggests it will take until 2215 for females to be equally represented in the asset management industry if the current rate of virtually imperceptible progress continues (Citywire, 2020). The marginal increase of female fund managers in the Citywire database is inconsistent with increasing equality and development across other industries. Citywire reports $11 \%$ female fund managers in 2020 , up just $0.3 \%$ from $10.8 \%$ in 2019 and $10.3 \%$ in 2016 . Comparing this to the global statistic of $29 \%$ of females working in senior management roles worldwide, with $87 \%$ of global mid-market companies having at least one female in a senior management role in 2020 (Catalyst, 2020). Through this data pool, Citywire found that mixed-gendered fund management teams produce better riskadjusted returns than single-gendered teams.
The aim of this paper is to ascertain if gender is a contributing factor for fund managers' performance, through the analysis of data from 2012-2022 attained from investment funds in eight major sectors which are available to UK investors. Through a deep dive into related literature the research question at hand "Do female fund managers outperform their male counterparts? A quantitative analysis." was formulated.
Null Hypothesis: Funds with female participation (sole manager or a at least one female manager in the team) underperform funds solely managed by men.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the literature review of related academic articles recognizing the broader framework and supporting the research question to allow wider linkages that exist beyond the scope of the research is outlined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes the data set and Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used to examine the research question. The findings are discussed in Chapter 5 followed by final remarks in Chapter 6. Detailed results are presented in tables in the appendix.

## 2. Literature Review

The literature review is structured into four parts. First, an inquiry into gender bias when customers are investing in investment funds, deciphering whether there is rational statistical discrimination or irrational gender prejudice. Next, an exploration into the return and risk-taking behaviours of male, female and mixedgendered hedge fund managers. Following is a probe into the desired societal perceptions of managers and last is a study into the neuroimaging concept of brain
androgyny. Through this literature, we developed the research question and gained an understanding of previous academics' investigations and research.

Table 1: Rational statistical discrimination or irrational prejudice due to gender bias
\(\left.$$
\begin{array}{|l|l|}\hline \text { Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2017) } & \begin{array}{l}\text { The authors document significantly lower inflows in } \\
\text { female-managed funds over male-managed funds } \\
\text { through an empirical investigation using data from all } \\
\text { single-managed US equity mutual funds from 1992- } \\
\text { 2009. It was found that the growth rate of female- } \\
\text { managed funds was over one-third lower than their male } \\
\text { counterparts. These findings lead them to question if } \\
\text { investors shy away from female fund managers due to } \\
\text { rational statistical discrimination or irrational prejudice } \\
\text { due to gender bias. }\end{array} \\
\hline \text { Phelps (1972) } & \begin{array}{l}\text { Phelps divulges that a priori belief in the plausible } \\
\text { preferability of a certain group (in our case males) over }\end{array}
$$ <br>

another (females) who are not known to differ in any\end{array}\right\}\)| other respects might stem from the previous statistical |
| :--- |
| experience with the two groups. The other possibility is |
| that this preconceived idea could stem from prevailing |
| sociological beliefs of the disadvantaged group (female) |
| due to prejudices toward them in society. In the latter |
| case, the discrimination is self-perpetuating. Phelps |
| highlights that discrimination is no less damaging to its |
| victims for being statistical but instead offers insight. |$|$

Table 2: Return and risk-taking behaviour

| Aggarwal and Boyson (2015) | The researchers use data from 1994-2013 to explore hedge funds' return and risk-taking behaviour with mixedgendered, all-female or all-male portfolio managers. They found in single-style funds that female-only fund managers perform no different to male-only fund managers with mixed-gendered funds underperforming, suggesting that there are no intrinsic differences in skill sets in male and female fund managers. In funds of funds, all groups had similar performances. They also investigated failure rates across funds, finding that funds with mixed-gendered portfolio managers fail at higher rates, driven by an inability to raise sufficient capital. Interestingly, surviving funds with mixed-gendered fund managers perform better than male-only managed funds, proving that female managers need to perform better to survive. |
| :---: | :---: |
| Gompers et al. (2014) | The authors explore venture capitalism where they found over $75 \%$ of venture capital firms have no women working as managers/analysts resulting in no females sitting on the boards of those portfolio companies. They attribute their finding of a slight underperformance in female venture capitalists to a lack of mentoring for female venture capitalists and gender bias on the part of entrepreneurs. |
| Atkinson, Baird and Frye (2003) | Their study of professional fund managers shows that male and female fund managers do not significantly differ in terms of performance and risk. They suggest that differences in investment behaviour often accredited to gender could be attributed to financial knowledge and wealth constraints. However, despite their performancebased findings, they also found that the gender of the manager influences the decision-making of the investor. Net asset flows into female-managed funds were significantly lower than males, constant with gender-based stereotypes. |

Table 3: Societal perceptions of the qualities of a great leader

| Schein (1973) | Schein uses a database of 300 24-64-year-old males to <br> rate female and male managers as well as successful <br> middle managers using 92 descriptive terms. The <br> perceived belief was found to be that the ideal manager <br> would possess stereotypic masculine qualities such as <br> self-confidence, independence, assertiveness, <br> dominance and rationality. |
| :--- | :--- |
| Powell \& Butterfield, 1979; Schein, 2007; <br> Schein, Mueller, Lituchy, \& Liu, 1996 | These authors suggest that across different industries <br> and countries, the ideal manager was described in <br> masculine terms by both genders |
| Eagly and Karau, 2002 | Additionally, female characteristics are considered <br> antithetical to success in management bearing the <br> argument that these societal perceptions of the qualities <br> a leader should possess inherently disadvantage <br> women in management, forcing them to cope with the <br> perceived incongruity between their leadership role <br> and their gender role |
| Kark, Waismel-Manor and Shamir (2012) | The authors explore the individuals' perception of the <br> effectiveness of leaders based on having feminine, <br> masculine or androgynous characteristics and how this <br> relates to the leader and followers' gender. 930 <br> employees of 76 bank managers were studied to <br> establish the relationship between managers' gender- <br> roll identity and how this relates to leadership <br> effectiveness in terms of transformational leadership <br> and personal identification with the leader, based on |
| level of perceived femininity, masculinity or |  |
| androgyny. They found managers to be most effective |  |
| when possessing the aptitude to combine agentic and |  |
| communal behaviours in a flexible way. However, |  |
| female managers are perceived to be most effective |  |
| when occupying androgynous characteristics alongside |  |
| feminine characteristics when managing single and |  |
| mixed-gendered employees, while male managers only |  |
| see the benefits of being androgynous when managing |  |
| mixed-gendered or female-only employees. This is |  |
| amplified by the finding that male employees are more |  |$|$

Table 4: Neuroimaging concept of brain androgyny

| Sahakian et al., 2021 | Conversely, the authors studied 4,495 male <br> and 5,125 female participants to find that 25\% <br> of brains were identified as male, 25\% as <br> female and 50\% were distributed across the <br> androgynous section of the continuum. This <br> indicates that the brain does not conform to one <br> biological gender role, and rather places <br> individuals on a spectrum from male to female: <br> confirming a neuroimaging concept of brain <br> androgyny. Sahakian et al, go on to explore the <br> theory that androgynous people are more <br> adaptable, accepting and flexible which leads <br> to better mental health. This is highlighted by <br> a meta-analysis of around 20,000 people, <br> revealing that men who conform to typical <br> masculine norms, such as never relying on <br> others and exercising power over women, <br> suffered more psychiatric symptoms, <br> including depression, loneliness and substance |
| :---: | :--- |
| abuse. They also felt more isolated, lacking |  |
| social connections to others. |  |

The research question arose from the above literature along with a personal interest in females in finance. In today's modern world the discrepancy between male and female involvement in finance, and more specifically in fund managers, is deplorable. As a society aiming for inclusion, equality and equal opportunity, there should be an investigation into why only a small number of funds are managed by women. There is no significant research on the performance of women fund managers for UK investors. The authors intend to fill this gap with this paper.

## 2. Data

In our empirical investigation, we analyse the secondary data (monthly performance, assets under management, fees, inception data, names of fund managers etc.) of fund managers in eight major IA sectors (Asian, European, North American, UK All Companies and UK Income Equity; Targeted Absolute Return, Sterling Corporate Bonds and 40-85 Sector funds). The data represents a large proportion of available and investable funds for UK investors for a ten-year period (May 2012April 2022). The Investment Association (IA) groups UK funds into broad groups (sectors), each with a different investment focus. There are around 4,500 funds available to UK individual and institutional investors classified into the 50 IA sectors (The Investment Association). The data is sourced from the Financial Express Analytics database.
In our analysis, we differentiate between funds managed by men only, by women only, by mixed teams (one or more women in a team) and unclassified (quant funds or other funds where no specific person is assigned and no gender is identifiable), often passively managed quant funds.

## 3. Research Method

The research design is based on the authors' experience as academic and professional researchers. The qualitative and quantitative data are used in the quantitative analysis regarding gender (number of male and female respectively unclassified management teams, assets under management (AUM), track records, ongoing-charges figure (fees, OCF), FE risk scores), in the descriptive statistics and in the risk analysis.
In the descriptive analytics, we calculate the mean, i.e. the arithmetic average of returns, annualized standard deviation which displays the variation from the mean and is a useful tool to determine the volatility of returns, the skew which measures a dataset's symmetry or lack thereof (with a perfectly symmetrical data set holding a skewness of 0 , positive skewness meaning the tail on the right side of the distribution is longer or fatter while negative skewness is the opposite) and the kurtosis, used to describe the tails of the distributions, measuring the outliers present in the distribution: high kurtosis indicates that the data has heavy tails or outliers, while low kurtosis indicates that the data has light tails of lack of outliers. Maximum and minimum returns are useful indicators when comparing volatility and performance outliers within the data. We also test for normality using the JarqueBera test whose null hypothesis is a joint hypothesis of the skewness being zero and the excess kurtosis being zero. These descriptive statistics are all based on 10-year data.
The risk statistics section includes calculations of the average, minimum and maximum values of the 5-year alpha, beta, bull beta to the market, bear beta to the market; Sharpe, Sortino and Information ratios; volatility of each sector. As the funds have different inception dates, only funds with a common track record of at least five years are used for the quantitative part of the study.

## 4. Findings

We discuss the findings whose data is in the Appendix. The first section covers the number of funds, AUM, track record, OCF and FE Risk Scores.
Table 1.1 shows the total of 1269 funds across the 8 sectors, divided into classified (885) and unclassified funds (384), funds with at least one female manager in a team ( $14-25 \%$ ), co-lead ( $5-13 \%$ ) and sole female ( $0-9 \%$ ). In total, there are 35 female lead managers, 76 female co-leads and the remainder female participation, in total 150 women ( $17 \%$ ) are involved in fund management, versus 724 ( $83 \%$ ) run by men. Women are more likely to manage funds in specialist sectors (IA Asia Pacific ex Japan: 8 women as leads ( $9 \%$ ) and 5 as co-leads ( $5 \%$ ); IA UK All Companies: 11 women as leads ( $6 \%$ ) and 17 as co-leads ( $9 \%$ )). By contrast in the major IA North America equity sector no women as leads ( $0 \%$ ) but 17 as co-leads (13\%) and 5 more in teams. In general, female participation (i.e. team roles other than lead or co-lead positions) tends to be low (across the sectors between 0-5\%), underlining the minor role women play in teams.
Assets under management (AUM) are shown in Table 1.2: total assets are shy of $£ 1$ trillion (£ 968b) of which $62 \%$ are classified and $38 \%$ are unclassified. In terms of AUM, men manage $86 \%$ of all assets in the eight sectors, versus $14 \%$ managed by women, which is larger than the gender split (number of men (83\%) vs women $(17 \%)$ ). The larger sectors IA Europe and IA North America are just over 50\% classified (indicating the large passive industry) versus $93 \%$ in IA UK Equity Income and $84 \%$ in IA Targeted Absolute Return. Women participation is highest in smaller, specialist sectors (IA Asia Pacific ex Japan, 21\% of AUM, while 25\% in terms of numbers; IA Targeted Absolute Return, 20\% of AUM and numbers). The data also shows the overall lower AUM (max and average) of funds with female participation.
The Track Records of Male and Female Fund Managers in Table 1.3 show shorter track records for mixed team funds, though both sole and mixed managed funds tend to have long track records, sufficient for our analysis.
The fee Table 1.4 (OCF = Ongoing charges figure, which includes the AMC (annual management cost), registration fee, custody safekeeping and transaction fees, audit fees and regulatory fees) gives a breakdown not unfavourable for female managers. This is surprising as smaller funds tend to be more expensive as the cost has to be shouldered by smaller AUM.
Table 1.5 covers the lower risk women tend to take as demonstrated in the lower FE scores (a variation of annual volatility, as a relative measure to the FTSE 100, whereby funds with FE scores below 100 tend to be less volatile than the index). This is most evident in the lower max risk scores of female managers: IA 40-85 Sector (men: 98 vs women 71); IA Europe (147 vs 134); IA North America (260 vs 219); Sterling Corporate Bond (73 vs 69); IA Targeted Absolute Return (176 vs 130); IA UK All Companies (152 vs 127) and IA UK Equity Income (141 vs 112). Only in IA Asia Pacific ex Japan women max risk scores are higher (men 119 vs women 124). Average and min FE Scores of women are slightly higher than these
of men, which might be explained by the smaller number of women as well as the better risk management skills of female managers.
The second section covers descriptive statistics and the risk and return analysis of the eight sectors (Tables 2.1.1-2.8.3 in the Appendix).
In the IA 40-85 Sector women tend to produce lower absolute (10-year mean returns of men: $7.4 \%$ vs $6.94 \%$ ) but better risk-adjusted returns (10-year standard deviation returns of men: $8.98 \%$ vs $8.44 \%$ ). The slightly better risk management of female managers and teams is also evident in the 5-year Alpha, Beta, Sharpe, Sortino \& Information Ratios for min and max values. Sharpe ratio of men: 0.37 vs 0.38 and Sortino ratio of men: 0.33 vs 0.34 . The high Jarque-Bera statistic / low p-value signal that the data is not normally distributed.
In IA Asia Pacific ex Japan we observe again lower mean returns of women but also lower standard deviation (10-year data). 5-year Sharpe ratio of men: 0.40 vs 0.42 and Sortino ratio of men: 0.40 vs 0.43 . The higher Jarque-Bera statistic / low pvalue signal that the data is not normally distributed.
IA Europe shows mean returns of men $11.42 \%$ vs women $10.47 \%$ (10-year) but better risk-adjusted returns (standard deviation returns of men $8.98 \%$ vs women $8.44 \%$ ). The Risk Statistics for 5 Year Period are slightly better for men: Sharpe ratio of men: 0.34 vs 0.30 and Sortino ratio of men: 0.34 vs 0.31 . The higher JarqueBera statistic / low p-value signal that the data is not normally distributed.
In IA North America the mean returns of men are lower at $15.51 \%$ vs women at $15.60 \%$ (10-year) and higher standard deviations for men at $11.79 \%$ vs women at $11.60 \%$. The Risk Statistics for 5 Year Period are slightly better for men: Sharpe ratio of men: 0.78 vs 0.74 and Sortino ratio of men: 0.75 vs 0.72 . The higher JarqueBera statistic / low p-value signal that the data is not normally distributed.
The Sterling Corporate Bond sector shows lower mean returns of men at $4.07 \%$ vs women at $4.89 \%$ (10-year) and lower standard deviations for men at $5.90 \%$ vs women at $6.93 \%$. This results in similar Risk Statistics for the 5 Year Period for men: Sharpe ratio of men: 0.07 vs 0.08 and Sortino ratio of men: 0.04 vs 0.04 . The very low Jarque-Bera statistic / high p-value mean that the normal distribution of data cannot be rejected.
IA Targeted Absolute Return funds depict better mean returns for men (higher) at $3.78 \%$ vs women at $3.430 \%$ and better (lower) standard deviations for men at $3.33 \%$ vs women at $3.93 \%$ (10-year). While in the 5 -Year Risk Statistics, the Sharpe ratios are similar for men at 0.27 vs women at 0.28 , the Sortino ratios are better for men at 0.19 vs women at 0.05 . The very low Jarque-Bera statistic / high p-value indicate that normal distribution cannot be rejected.
In the IA UK All Companies sector, the mean returns for men are significantly higher at $8.93 \%$ vs women at $7.65 \%$ and standard deviations only slightly worse (higher) for men at $13.39 \%$ vs women at $12.90 \%$ (10-year). For the 5 -Year Risk Statistics, the Sharpe ratios are also better for men at 0.20 vs women at 0.14 , the Sortino ratios are better for men at 0.18 vs women at 0.13 . The very low JarqueBera statistic / high p-value indicate that normal distribution cannot be rejected.
IA UK Equity Income funds show again better mean returns for men (higher) at
$8.27 \%$ vs women at $8.06 \%$ but worse (higher) standard deviations for men at $12.72 \%$ vs women at $12.19 \%$ (10-year). For the 5-Year Risk Statistics, the Sharpe ratios are slightly better for men at 0.16 vs women at 0.14 as well as the Sortino ratios for men at 0.14 vs women at 0.12 . The very low Jarque-Bera statistic / high p -value indicate here too that normal distribution cannot be rejected.

## 5. Final Remarks

This culminating chapter returns to the initially presented aims, research questions and objectives, and provides an overall response to them as derived from the previous chapters. The chapter offers concluding remarks not only in response to the research question but also highlights any gained insights.
We observed that in most cases the Sharpe and Sortino ratios are below one, indicating inferior risk-adjusted returns, as well as in several sectors lower Sortino ratios than the Sharpe ratios, pointing towards higher downside than mean volatilities. Like Sharpe ratios, higher Sortino ratios are preferred as they are more consistent with risk. Second, in all strategies, the risk statistics are better for unclassified (i.e., passive) strategies than funds by actively managed men or women. We also saw that the normal distribution of returns cannot be rejected for half of the strategies.
These results show that over the 5- and 10-year periods, funds with at least one female manager produce slightly better risk-adjusted returns in half of the strategies and similar to only slightly lower statistics in the remainder. These findings generally align with the literature review in the way that there is not any major discrepancy between male and female fund manager performance in terms of return and volatility. The immense inequality of female fund managers and females in finance seems more likely due to the propensity of investors to invest in maledominated funds due to an irrational prejudice due to gender bias, therefore making it harder for women to attain capital. This gender bias stems from early education where there are fewer women encouraged to enter the field and are faced with discrimination throughout their educational and occupational development. The literature also highlights a gender bias when it comes to determining positive characteristics of managers to be masculine, which is not reflective of our data, nor compelling evidence to suggest masculine traits are superior to feminine traits in any field. To see a more equal representation of genders in finance and more importantly in managerial roles, there needs to be equal opportunity in all aspects of early development, education and the workplace.
A limitation of this data set lies within the sample size, which is limited to funds available to UK investors in eight sectors. Another conceivable limitation is a potential bias that arises from ascertaining the gender of fund managers which was done through determining first names and online research. Thus, to fully understand the performance of male-only fund managers versus funds with at least one female manager, more data needs to be collected and analysed. Future research will focus on other IA sectors, offshore funds and other geographies (European fund markets, the USA and Asia).

## References

[1] Aggarwal, R. and Boyson, N.M. (2015). The performance of female hedge fund managers. Review of Financial Economics, 29, pp.1-38.
[2] Atkinson, S.M., Baird, S.B. and Frye, M.B. (2003). Do Female Mutual Fund Managers Manage Differently? Journal of Financial Research, 26(1), pp.1-18.
[3] Bertrand, Marianne, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz, 2010, Dynamics of the gender gap for young professionals in the financial and corporate sectors, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, 228-255.
[4] Catalyst (2020). Quick Take: Women in Management - Catalyst. [online] Catalyst. Available at: https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-inmanagement/.
[5] CITYWIRE (2020). Alpha Female 2020: parity for female PMs is almost 200 years away. [online] Citywireselector.com. Available at:
https://citywireselector.com/news/alpha-female-2020-parity-for-female-pms-is-almost-200-years-away/a1400250?section=global [Accessed 2 Mar. 2021].
[6] Eagly, A.H. and Karau, S.J. (2002). Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders. Psychological Review, 109(3), pp.573-598.
[7] Financial Express Analytics. https://analytics.financialexpress.net/login.aspx [Accessed 14 June 2022].
[8] Becker, Gary Stanley (1971). The economics of discrimination ... 2nd ed. Chicago, London: University Of Chicago Press.
[9] Goldin, Claudia, and Cecilia Rouse, 2000, Orchestrating impartiality: The impact of 'blind' auditions on female musicians, American Economic Review 90, 715-741.
[10] Gompers, P.A., Mukharlyamov, V., Weisburst, E. and Xuan, Y. (2014). Gender Effects in Venture Capital. SSRN Electronic Journal.
[11] Kark, R., Waismel-Manor, R. and Shamir, B. (2012). Does valuing androgyny and femininity lead to a female advantage? The relationship between genderrole, transformational leadership and identification. The Leadership Quarterly, 23(3), pp.620-640.
[12] Niessen-Ruenzi, A. and Ruenzi, S. (2017). Sex Matters: Gender Bias in the Mutual Fund Industry. [online] papers.ssrn.com. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1957317 [Accessed 21 Jan. 2021].
[13] Phelps, E.S. (1972). The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism. [online] ResearchGate. Available at:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/4728049_The_Statistical_Theory_o f_Racism_and_Sexism [Accessed 21 Jan. 2021].
[14] Polachek, Solomon William (1981). "Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex Differences in Occupational Structure," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 63(1), pages 60-69, February.
[15] Powell, G. N., \& Butterfield, D. A. (1979). The "good manager": Masculine or androgynous? Academy of Management Journal, 22, 395-403.
[16] Sahakian, B.J., Langley, C., Luo, Q. and Zhang, Y. (2021). "Male" vs "female" brains: having a mix of both is common and offers big advantages. [online] theconversation.com. Available at:https://theconversation.com/male-vs-female-brains-having-a-mix-of-both-is-common-and-offers-big-advantages-new-research 153242?utm_medium=email\&utm_campaign= The $\% 20$ Weekend $\% 20$ Conversation $\% 20 \% 201841917926 \& u t m \_c o n t e n t=T h e$ \%20Weekend\%20Conversation\%20\%201841917926+CID_abbbdcf645e2ee b0e6396a695ab2b828\&utm_source=campaign_monitor_uk [Accessed 8 Feb. 2021].
[17] Schein, V. E. (1973). The relationship between sex role stereotypes and requisite management characteristics. Journal of Applied Psychology, 57,95100.
[18] Schein, V. E. (2007). Women in management: Reflections and projections. Women in Management Review,22,6-16.
[19] Schein, V. E., Mueller, R., Lituchy, T., \& Liu, J. (1996). Think manager-think male: A global phenomenon? Journal of Organizational Behavior, 17,33-41.
[20] The Investment Association. https://www.theia.org [Accessed 26 April 2023].

## Appendix

## 1. Quantitative Data - Number of Funds, AUM, Track Record, OCF \& Risk Scores

Table Appendix 1.1: Number of Male and Female Fund Managers


| Total men and women in sample | 207 |  | 123 |  | 152 |  | 239 |  | 104 |  | 106 |  | 251 |  | 87 |  | 1269 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unclassified | 78 | 38\% | 31 | 25\% | 56 | 37\% | 104 | 44\% | 19 | 18\% | 20 | 19\% | 66 | 26\% | 10 | 11\% | 384 | 30\% |
| Total men and women in sample excl Unclassified | 129 | 100\% | 92 | 100\% | 96 | 100\% | 135 | 100\% | 85 | 100\% | 86 | 100\% | 185 | 100\% | 77 | 100\% | 885 | 70\% |


| Total men | 107 | $83 \%$ | 69 | $75 \%$ | 82 | $85 \%$ | 106 | $79 \%$ | 71 | $84 \%$ | 69 | $80 \%$ | 154 | $83 \%$ | 66 | $86 \%$ | 724 | $82 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Total women | 22 | $17 \%$ | 19 | $25 \%$ | 14 | $15 \%$ | 22 | $21 \%$ | 14 | $16 \%$ | 17 | $20 \%$ | 31 | $17 \%$ | 11 | $14 \%$ | 150 | $17 \%$ |
| Women - Sole | 5 | $4 \%$ | 8 | $9 \%$ | 1 | $1 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 5 | $6 \%$ | 1 | $1 \%$ | 11 | $6 \%$ | 4 | $5 \%$ | 35 | $4 \%$ |
| Co Lead | 10 | $8 \%$ | 5 | $5 \%$ | 9 | $9 \%$ | 17 | $13 \%$ | 7 | $8 \%$ | 7 | $8 \%$ | 17 | $9 \%$ | 4 | $5 \%$ | 76 | $9 \%$ |
| One in team of 3 | 6 | $5 \%$ | 4 | $4 \%$ | 4 | $4 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 2 | $2 \%$ | 3 | $3 \%$ | 3 | $2 \%$ | 3 | $4 \%$ | 25 | $3 \%$ |
| One in team of 4 | 1 | $1 \%$ | 2 | $2 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 3 | $2 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 5 | $6 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 11 | $1 \%$ |
| One in team of 5 | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 2 | $1 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 1 | $1 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 3 | $0 \%$ |
| One in team of 6 | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ | 0 | $0 \%$ |

Table Appendix 1.2: AUM of Male and Female Fund Managers

| AUM (in m \$ | D 0 0 0 0 $\sim$ $\sim$ 0 0 0 |  |  |  | D m m o D |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AUM All total | 89,092 |  | 69,474 |  | 97,848 |  | 341,610 |  | 67,210 |  | 62,110 |  | 195,093 |  | 46,413 |  | 968,849 |  |
| AUM All average | 441 |  | 560 |  | 644 |  | 1,429 |  | 659 |  | 586 |  | 784 |  | 533 |  |  |  |
| min | - |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 14 |  | 2 |  | 2 |  | 0 |  |  |  |
| max | 13,729 |  | 5,386 |  | 5,719 |  | 44,711 |  | 5,482 |  | 5,301 |  | 13,900 |  | 4,647 |  |  |  |
| AUM Unclassified | 34,483 | 39\% | 17,580 | 25\% | 47,646 | 49\% | 163,754 | 48\% | 15,216 | 23\% | 10,216 | 16\% | 75,938 | 39\% | 3,424 | 7\% |  |  |
| AUM - Classified (in m \$) | 54,609 | 61\% | 51,894 | 75\% | 50,202 | 51\% | 177,856 | 52\% | 51,994 | 77\% | 51,894 | 84\% | 119,155 | 61\% | 42,989 | 93\% | 600,592 | 62\% |
| AUM men total (Classified) | 46,940 | 86\% | 40,908 | 79\% | 47,530 | 95\% | 151,235 | 85\% | 42,414 | 82\% | 41,747 | 80\% | 107,809 | 90\% | 37,009 | 86\% | 515,590 | 86\% |
| AUM men average | 451 |  | 593 |  | 580 |  | 1,427 |  | 615 |  | 605 |  | 709 |  | 561 |  |  |  |
| min | 1 |  | 1 |  | 2 |  | 2 |  | 18 |  | 8 |  | 2 |  | 2 |  |  |  |
| max | 7,139 |  | 5,386 |  | 4,699 |  | 44,711 |  | 5,482 |  | 5,301 |  | 11,557 |  | 4,647 |  |  |  |
| AUM women participation total | 7,670 | 14\% | 10,706 | 21\% | 2,672 | 5\% | 26,621 | 15\% | 9,580 | 18\% | 10,147 | 20\% | 11,346 | 10\% | 5,981 | 14\% | 84,722 | 14\% |
| AUM women participation average | 349 |  | 465 |  | 191 |  | 918 |  | 684 |  | 597 |  | 366 |  | 544 |  |  |  |
| min | 4 |  | 4 |  | 2 |  | 3 |  | 19 |  | 2 |  | 24 |  | 94 |  |  |  |
| max | 2,022 |  | 2,268 |  | 483 |  | 4,120 |  | 2,477 |  | 5,196 |  | 1,429 |  | 2,056 |  |  |  |
| AUM unclassified total | 34,483 | 39\% | 17,580 | 25\% | 47,646 | 49\% | 163,754 | 48\% | 15,216 | 23\% | 10,216 | 16\% | 75,938 | 39\% | 3,424 | 7\% | 368,256 | 38\% |
| AUM unclassified average | 454 |  | 567 |  | 851 |  | 1,575 |  | 801 |  | 511 |  | 1,151 |  | 342 |  |  |  |
| min | - |  | 2 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 14 |  | 3 |  | 5 |  | 0 |  |  |  |
| max | 13,729 |  | 2,999 |  | 5,719 |  | 27,437 |  | 3,773 |  | 2,953 |  | 13,900 |  | 1,247 |  |  |  |

Table Appendix 1.3: Track Records of Male and Female Fund Managers

| Track Record | $B$ $\stackrel{1}{0}$ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { D } \\ & \text { m } \\ & \stackrel{1}{3} \\ & \text { O} \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fund Manager Since (all - longest track record) | 13/10/1988 | 01/08/1996 | 19/02/2001 | 30/06/1994 | 09/09/1998 | 01/07/2000 | 01/03/1988 | 01/01/2000 |
| Fund Manager Since (men - longest track record) | 17/11/1994 | 01/11/2001 | 19/02/2001 | 30/05/1997 | 09/09/1998 | 01/07/2000 | 15/05/1988 | 01/01/2000 |
| Fund Manager Since (mixed teams with women - longest track record) | 23/12/1998 | 01/08/1996 | 15/11/2006 | 14/07/1999 | 01/11/2004 | 01/07/2005 | 01/03/1988 | 18/10/2002 |
| Fund Manager Since (women sole longest track record) | 01/03/2010 | 01/06/2009 | 01/04/2020 | NA | 01/09/2008 | 18/10/2016 | 01/01/1999 | 01/06/2009 |

Table Appendix 1.4: OCF of Male and Female Fund Managers

| OCF |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { I } \\ & \text { m } \\ & \text { 음 } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| OCF average - all (in \%) | 1.00 | 0.90 | 0.69 | 0.62 | 0.45 | 0.90 | 0.73 | 0.84 |
| OCF - all - min (in \%) | - | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.02 | - | 0.05 | 0.03 |
| OCF - all - max (in \%) | 2.42 | 3.75 | 1.44 | 2.08 | 1.03 | 2.17 | 1.70 | 2.42 |
| OCF - average - men only (in \%) | 1.07 | 1.09 | 0.89 | 0.83 | 0.50 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 0.86 |
| OCF - men - min (in \%) | 0.22 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.35 | 0.06 | 0.03 |
| OCF - men - max (in \%) | 2.42 | 3.75 | 1.44 | 1.98 | 1.03 | 1.68 | 1.70 | 2.42 |
| OCF - women only (in \%) | 1.14 | 0.92 | 0.84 | 0.80 | 0.39 | 0.98 | 0.86 | 0.89 |
| OCF - women - min (in \%) | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.14 | 0.04 | 0.62 | 0.30 | 0.47 |
| OCF - women - max (in \%) | 1.84 | 1.39 | 1.29 | 2.08 | 0.65 | 1.75 | 1.32 | 1.23 |
| OCF - not classified (in \%) | 0.87 | 0.46 | 0.31 | 0.36 | 0.31 | 0.90 | 0.46 | 0.60 |
| OCF - min (in \%) | - | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.10 | - | 0.05 | 0.14 |
| OCF - max(in \%) | 1.78 | 1.09 | 1.15 | 1.65 | 1.00 | 2.17 | 1.59 | 1.23 |

Table Appendix 1.5: FE Risk Scores of Male and Female Fund Managers

| FE Risk Scores | $\begin{array}{ll} n \\ \infty \\ \infty \\ & \Delta \\ 0 & 0 \\ & 0 \\ 0 \end{array}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { D } \\ & \text { m } \\ & \frac{\Gamma}{\bar{O}} \\ & \text { D } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FE Risk Scores - All - average | 62 | 93 | 114 | 106 | 33 | 39 | 102 | 98 |
| FE Risk Scores - All - min | 43 | 66 | 89 | 76 | 10 | 6 | 75 | 71 |
| FE Risk Scores - All - max | 98 | 124 | 147 | 260 | 73 | 176 | 152 | 141 |
| FE Risk Scores - men - average | 64 | 94 | 109 | 107 | 33 | 38 | 103 | 98 |
| FE Risk Scores - men - min | 44 | 66 | 92 | 76 | 10 | 6 | 75 | 71 |
| FE Risk Scores - men - max | 98 | 119 | 147 | 260 | 73 | 176 | 152 | 141 |
| FE Risk Scores - women - average | 59 | 95 | 110 | 110 | 38 | 44 | 103 | 94 |
| FE Risk Scores - women - min | 49 | 66 | 89 | 82 | 14 | 13 | 82 | 82 |
| FE Risk Scores - women - max | 71 | 124 | 134 | 219 | 69 | 130 | 127 | 112 |
| FE Risk Scores - unclassified average | 62 | 90 | 122 | 105 | 31 | 36 | 100 | 105 |
| FE Risk Scores - unclassified - | 43 | 83 | 98 | 78 | 14 | 7 | 85 | 93 |
| FE Risk Scores - unclassified - | 87 | 106 | 140 | 210 | 45 | 91 | 144 | 123 |

## 2. Quantitative Data - Performance \& Risk; Descriptive Statistics

All performance data from May 2012 to April 2022 (10 years) respectively May 2017 to April 2022 (5 years).

Table Appendix 2.1.1: Discrete Annual Performance of IA 40-85 Sector

| Annual Performance \& Number of Funds in Year |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| All funds | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 15.25 | 5.34 | 11.20 | 2.54 | 17.52 | 5.12 | 3.91 | 4.27 | 21.74 | 0.06 |
| Number of funds | 101 | 108 | 118 | 123 | 139 | 149 | 162 | 168 | 181 | 199 |
| Men only | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 15.65 | 5.69 | 11.17 | 2.41 | 17.20 | 5.35 | 3.50 | 4.55 | 22.55 | 0.12 |
| Number of funds | 62 | 66 | 72 | 74 | 83 | 85 | 89 | 92 | 100 | 103 |
| Women participation | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 14.70 | 4.24 | 10.57 | 2.18 | 17.36 | 4.53 | 3.89 | 3.43 | 20.54 | 0.83 |
| Number of funds | 11 | 11 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 18 | 18 | 20 | 20 | 21 |
| Unclassified | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 14.58 | 4.98 | 11.49 | - 2.92 | 18.19 | 4.93 | 4.59 | 4.12 | 20.80 | 0.57 |
| Number of funds | 28 | 31 | 33 | 36 | 43 | 46 | 55 | 56 | 61 | 75 |

Table Appendix 2.1.2: Descriptive Statistics for the 10-year Period of IA 40-85

## Sector

Descriptive Statistics for 10 year Period to 2022:


Table Appendix 2.1.3: Risk Statistics for the 5-year Period of IA 40-85 Sector
Risk Statistics for 5 Year Period
Alpha, Beta, Sharpe, Sortino \& Information Ratios for min and max values

| All funds | 5 year Alpha | 5 year <br> Beta | 5 year Bull Beta | 5 year <br> Bear Beta | 5 year Sharpe | 5 year <br> Sortino | 5 year Info Ratio Rel. | 5 year Volatility |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| min | 9.47 | 0.67 | 0.53 | 0.48 | 0.01 | 0.27 | 1.17 | 6.79 |
| mean | 0.02 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.39 | 0.35 | 0.01 | 10.32 |
| max | 6.19 | 1.62 | 1.73 | 1.86 | 0.86 | 0.79 | 1.25 | 18.67 |

Men only

|  | - | 9.47 | 0.72 | 0.58 | 0.59 | - | 0.01 | - | 0.27 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | - | 0.11 | 1.02 | 1.02 | 1.04 | 0.37 | 0.33 | - | 0.03 |
| $\max$ | 6.19 | 1.62 | 1.73 | 1.86 | 0.86 | 0.79 | 10.64 |  |  |

Women participation

| min | - 1.69 | 0.78 | 0.76 | 0.54 | 0.19 | 0.15 |  | 0.62 | 8.24 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| mean | - 0.07 | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.95 | 0.38 | 0.34 | - | 0.14 | 9.71 |
| max | 2.30 | 1.12 | 1.15 | 1.23 | 0.64 | 0.62 |  | 0.41 | 11.17 |

Unclassified

| $\min$ |
| ---: |
|  |
|  |
|  |

Table Appendix 2.2.1: Discrete Annual Performance of IA Asia Pacific

Annual Performance \& Number of Funds in Year
Allfunds $\begin{array}{llllllllll}2012 & 2013 & 2014 & 2015 & 2016 & 2017 & 2018 & 2019 & 2020 & 2021\end{array}$

| Average performance | 18.43 | 6.80 | 22.60 | 9.90 | 35.38 | 12.36 | 2.71 | 5.45 | 38.35 | 7.87 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of funds | 83 | 86 | 99 | 102 | 108 | 109 | 111 | 115 | 117 | 123 |

Men only

| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |


| Average performance | 17.23 | - | 6.28 | 24.62 | -10.02 | 36.32 | 12.90 | 2.60 | -4.70 | 38.27 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Women participation

| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| 19.75 | 8.03 | 23.62 | - | 9.14 | 33.79 | 13.52 | 2.42 | -5.03 | 38.95 |

$\begin{array}{lllllllllllll}\text { Unclassified } & 2012 & 2013 & 2014 & 2015 & 2016 & 2017 & 2018 & 2019 & 2020 & 2021\end{array}$
Average performance
Number of funds

| 20.39 | -7.03 | 17.14 | -10.22 | 34.39 | 10.12 | 3.19 | -7.52 | 38.05 | -4.48 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 18 | 18 | 24 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 26 | 28 | 28 | 31 |

Table Appendix 2.2.2: Descriptive Statistics for the 10-year Period of IA Asia Pacific
Descriptive Statistics for 10 year Period to 2022:


Table Appendix 2.2.3: Risk Statistics for the 5-year Period of IA Asia Pacific
Risk Statistics for 5 Year Period
Alpha, Beta, Sharpe, Sortino \& Information Ratios for min and max values

| All funds | 5 year <br> Alpha | 5 year <br> Beta | 5 year <br> Bull Beta | 5 year <br> Bear Beta | 5 year <br> Sharpe | 5 year <br> Sortino | 5 year <br> Info <br> Ratio Rel | 5 year <br> Volatility |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| min | 5.35 | 0.79 | 0.68 | 0.69 | - | 0.01 | 1.16 | 11.05 |
| mean | 0.01 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.02 | 0.40 | 0.39 | 0.04 | 14.02 |
| max | 8.64 | 1.26 | 1.38 | 1.48 | 0.97 | 1.13 | 1.25 | 18.63 |
| Men only |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| min | 5.35 | 0.79 | 0.71 | 0.69 | - | 0.01 | 1.16 | 11.05 |
| mean | 0.01 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.04 | 13.95 |
| max | 8.64 | 1.26 | 1.38 | 1.42 | 0.97 | 1.13 | 1.25 | 16.91 |

Women participation

|  | - | 3.08 | 0.88 | 0.71 | 0.76 | 0.20 | 0.20 | - |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | 0.20 | 1.00 | 1.04 | 0.96 | 0.42 | 0.43 | - | 0.01 |
| $\max$ | 6.06 | 1.15 | 1.27 | 1.31 | 0.86 | 1.01 | 0.78 | 16.89 |

Unclassified

|  | - | 2.26 | 0.94 | 0.68 | 0.82 | 0.24 | 0.24 | - |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | - | 0.19 | 1.01 | 0.98 | 1.11 | 0.38 | 0.36 | - |
| $\max$ | 3.13 | 1.09 | 1.21 | 1.48 | 0.65 | 12.53 |  |  |

Table Appendix 2.3.1: Discrete Annual Performance of IA Europe
Annual Performance \& Number of Funds in Year
Allfunds

| Average performance | 26.18 | 16.46 | 6.82 | 0.66 | 27.48 | 8.65 | 0.19 | 8.34 | 35.88 | 2.52 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of funds | 95 | 102 | 108 | 113 | 119 | 123 | 129 | 137 | 139 | 145 |

Men only $\begin{array}{llllllllllll} & 2012 & 2013 & 2014 & 2015 & 2016 & 2017 & 2018 & 2019 & 2020 & 2021\end{array}$

| Average performance | 26.51 | 16.60 | 7.61 | 0.20 | 26.62 | 8.52 | 0.31 | 6.55 | 36.39 | 2.01 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of funds | 61 | 63 | 65 | 65 | 69 | 71 | 74 | 76 | 77 | 79 |

$\begin{array}{cccccccccccc}\text { Women participation } & 2012 & 2013 & 2014 & 2015 & 2016 & 2017 & 2018 & 2019 & 2020 & 2021\end{array}$

| Average performance | 24.79 | 13.28 | 5.71 | 0.32 | 27.45 | 8.25 | 0.63 | 6.41 | 34.58 | 3.26 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of funds | 10 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 |

Unclassified

| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Average performance Number of funds

| 25.92 | 17.28 | 5.58 | - | 2.27 | 29.03 | 9.00 | - | 0.16 | - |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Table Appendix 2.3.2: Descriptive Statistics for the 10-year Period of IA Europe Descriptive Statistics for 10 year Period to 2022:

|  | Mean | SD | Skew | Jarque- <br> Bera Test |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | Kurt | Statistic | $p$ value |
| All funds | 11.01 | 14.84 | 0.46 | - 1.12 | 10.51 | 0.52\% |
| Men only | 11.42 | 14.47 | 0.53 | 1.04 | 11.03 | 0.40\% |
| Women participation | 10.47 | 14.13 | 0.60 | 1.04 | 12.51 | 0.19\% |
| Unclassified | 10.51 | 15.72 | 0.32 | - 1.22 | 9.48 | 0.87\% |

Table Appendix 2.3.3: Risk Statistics for the 5-year Period of IA Europe
Risk Statistics for 5 Year Period
Alpha, Beta, Sharpe, Sortino \& Information Ratios for min and max values

| All funds | 5 year <br> Alpha | 5 year <br> Beta | 5 year Bull Beta | 5 year <br> Bear Beta | 5 year <br> Sharpe | 5 year <br> Sortino | 5 year <br> Info <br> Ratio Rel | 5 year <br> Volatility |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| min | 6.75 | 0.71 | 0.59 | 0.76 | - | - 0.09 | - 0.92 | 11.40 |
| mean | 0.20 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.31 | 0.31 | - 0.01 | 15.23 |
| max | 8.44 | 1.21 | 1.71 | 1.53 | 0.80 | 0.77 | 0.98 | 20.14 |

Men only


Women participation

|  | - | 5.34 | 0.71 | 0.59 | 0.76 | - | - | 0.02 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | 0.88 | 11.40 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 0.19 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.02 | 0.31 | 0.30 | - | 0.05 |
| $\max$ | 3.94 | 1.18 | 1.45 | 1.34 | 0.54 | 0.63 | 0.61 | 15.52 |

Unclassified

| min | 4.80 | 0.80 | 0.67 | 0.86 | - | 0.03 |  | 0.70 | 12.51 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| mean | 0.76 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 1.01 | 0.25 | 0.25 |  | 0.13 | 15.14 |
| max | 3.30 | 1.15 | 1.32 | 1.31 | 0.48 | 0.46 |  | 0.45 | 18.55 |

Table Appendix 2.4.1: Discrete Annual Performance of IA North America
Annual Performance \& Number of Funds in Year

| Allfunds | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average performance | 18.99 | 10.74 | 23.62 | 3.56 | 31.86 | 6.74 | 17.16 | 2.27 | 34.68 | 6.35 |
| Number of funds | 112 | 128 | 138 | 150 | 167 | 189 | 200 | 214 | 225 | 230 |
| Men only | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 17.67 | 10.92 | 23.83 | 2.76 | 32.06 | 7.48 | 17.51 | 3.69 | 35.07 | 4.15 |
| Number of funds | 65 | 74 | 82 | 87 | 89 | 95 | 95 | 101 | 105 | 105 |
| Women participation | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 20.22 | 10.47 | 23.99 | 3.42 | 30.29 | 7.54 | 16.91 | 3.60 | 35.31 | 4.22 |
| Number of funds | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 23 | 25 | 27 | 28 | 28 |
| Unclassified | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 21.13 | 10.51 | 22.98 | 5.16 | 32.07 | 5.47 | 16.81 | 0.18 | 34.05 | 9.35 |
| Number of funds | 30 | 37 | 38 | 45 | 59 | 71 | 80 | 86 | 92 | 97 |

Table Appendix 2.4.2: Descriptive Statistics for the 10-year Period of IA North America

Descriptive Statistics for 10 year Period to 2022:


Table Appendix 2.4.3: Risk Statistics for the 5-year Period of IA North America
Risk Statistics for 5 Year Period
Alpha, Beta, Sharpe, Sortino \& Information Ratios for min and max values

| All funds | 5 year Alpha | 5 year <br> Beta | 5 year Bull Beta | 5 year Bear Beta | 5 year <br> Sharpe | 5 year <br> Sortino | 5 year <br> Info <br> Ratio Rel. | 5 year Volatility |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\min$ | 9.67 | 0.42 | 0.25 | 0.21 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 1.21 | 11.61 |
| mean | 0.29 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.76 | 0.73 | 0.04 | 15.39 |
| $\max$ | 5.76 | 1.57 | 2.20 | 1.87 | 1.14 | 1.21 | 0.91 | 32.90 |
| Men only |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\min$ | 9.67 | 0.71 | 0.65 | 0.58 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 1.21 | 11.61 |
| mean | 0.28 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 0.98 | 0.78 | 0.75 | 0.06 | 15.35 |
| max | 5.33 | 1.38 | 1.62 | 1.87 | 1.08 | 1.21 | 0.82 | 26.92 |

Women participation

| $\min$ | - | 4.14 | 0.76 | 0.60 | 0.74 | 0.34 | 0.30 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | 0.17 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.74 | 0.72 | - |
| $\max$ | 5.34 | 1.57 | 1.85 | 1.51 | 1.08 | 1.16 | 0.01 |

Unclassified

| $\min$ | - | 8.49 | 0.42 | 0.25 | 0.21 | 0.19 | 0.18 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | 0.35 | 0.96 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 0.74 | 0.71 | 0.07 |
| $\max$ | 5.76 | 1.32 | 2.20 | 1.71 | 1.14 | 1.21 | 0.91 |
|  |  |  |  | 15.36 |  |  |  |

Table Appendix 2.5.1: Discrete Annual Performance of Sterling Corporate Bond

| Annual Performance \& Number of Funds in Year |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| All funds | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 14.93 | 0.33 | 8.37 | 1.31 | 8.98 | 1.24 | 3.20 | 5.20 | 4.79 | 7.37 |
| Number of funds | 68 | 75 | 80 | 84 | 85 | 94 | 95 | 97 | 101 | 102 |
| Men only | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 14.77 | 0.41 | 8.25 | 1.07 | 8.85 | 1.17 | 3.21 | 5.04 | 5.01 | 7.12 |
| Number of funds | 54 | 57 | 58 | 61 | 62 | 69 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 |
| Women participation | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 16.76 | 0.49 | 9.41 | 2.46 | 11.66 | 2.06 | 3.50 | 6.56 | 4.76 | 8.78 |
| Number of funds | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
| Unclassified | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 14.26 | 0.52 | 8.05 | 1.57 | 7.56 | 0.98 | 2.92 | 4.81 | 3.96 | 7.23 |
| Number of funds | 7 | 8 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 18 | 18 |

Table Appendix 2.5.2: Descriptive Statistics for the 10-year Period of Sterling Corporate Bond

Descriptive Statistics for 10 year Period to 2022:

|  | Mean | SD |  | Skew | Jarque- <br> Bera Test |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| All funds | 4.10 | 5.99 |  | 0.09 | 1.11 | 1.91 | 38.55\% |
| Men only | 4.07 | 5.90 |  | 0.06 | 1.05 | 1.68 | 43.23\% |
| Women participation | 4.89 | 6.93 |  | 0.25 | 1.13 | 2.30 | 31.74\% |
| Unclassified | 3.64 | 5.74 |  | 0.03 | 1.23 | 2.27 | 32.17\% |

Table Appendix 2.5.3: Risk Statistics for the 5-year Period of Sterling Corporate Bond

Risk Statistics for 5 Year Period
Alpha, Beta, Sharpe, Sortino \& Information Ratios for min and max values
5 year
5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year Info Ratio 5 year
All funds

|  | 5 year <br> Alpha | 5 year <br> Beta | 5 year Bull Beta | 5 year Bear Beta | 5 year <br> Sharpe | 5 year <br> Sortino | Info Ratio Rel. | 5 year Volatility |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| min | 1.38 | 0.33 | 0.28 | 0.24 | - | 0.30 | 0.78 | 2.06 |
| mean | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 5.63 |
| max | 2.99 | 2.04 | 2.23 | 1.61 | 0.51 | 0.41 | 1.51 | 11.51 |

Men only

| ${ } }$ | - | 1.38 | 0.33 | 0.28 | 0.24 | - | - | 0.30 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| - | 0.59 | 2.06 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | 0.04 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 1.02 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 5.58 |
|  | 2.99 | 2.04 | 2.23 | 1.61 | 0.51 | 0.41 | 1.51 | 11.51 |

Women participation

| $\min$ | - | 1.16 | 0.40 | 0.34 | 0.40 | - | - | 0.20 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| - | 0.52 | 2.29 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | - | 0.13 | 1.17 | 1.14 | 1.08 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.08 |
| $\max$ | 1.26 | 1.92 | 2.04 | 1.51 | 0.29 | 0.23 | 0.83 | 10.79 |

Unclassified

| $\min$ | - | 1.01 | 0.34 | 0.30 | 0.38 | - | - | 0.22 | - |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | - | 0.12 | 0.90 | 0.91 | 0.87 | 0.05 | 0.00 | - | 0.11 |
| $\max$ | 1.58 | 1.27 | 1.39 | 1.16 | 0.35 | 0.32 | 1.46 | 6.94 |  |

Table Appendix 2.6.1: Discrete Annual Performance of IA Targeted Absolute Return

Annual Performance \& Number of Funds in Year

| All funds | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average performance | 7.78 | 4.31 | 6.00 | 0.03 | 5.46 | 2.32 | 0.10 | 0.49 | 9.11 | 1.78 |
| Number of funds | 43 | 48 | 54 | 63 | 73 | 81 | 86 | 97 | 102 | 103 |
| Men only | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 8.24 | 4.87 | 5.00 | 0.39 | 5.92 | 1.96 | 0.25 | 0.01 | 8.91 | 2.81 |
| Number of funds | 30 | 34 | 36 | 42 | 49 | 55 | 59 | 66 | 69 | 69 |
| Women participation | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 4.71 | 2.25 | 8.19 | 1.33 | 3.53 | 4.10 | 0.83 | 1.74 | 11.31 | 0.21 |
| Number of funds | 7 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 |
| Unclassified | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 9.05 | 3.91 | 7.74 | 2.94 | 5.55 | 1.89 | 0.89 | 1.28 | 8.07 | 0.42 |
| Number of funds | 6 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 16 | 18 | 18 |

Table Appendix 2.6.2: Descriptive Statistics for the 10-year Period of IA Targeted Absolute Return

Descriptive Statistics for 10 year Period to 2022:


Table Appendix 2.6.3: Risk Statistics for the 5-year Period of IA Targeted Absolute Return

Risk Statistics for 5 Year Period
Alpha, Beta, Sharpe, Sortino \& Information Ratios for min and max values
5 year
5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year Info Ratio 5 year
All funds

|  | Alpha | Beta | Bull Beta | Bear Beta | Sharpe | Sortino | Rel. | Volatility |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\min$ | - 7.27 | 1.04 | 3.24 | 2.35 | 0.01 | 1.47 | 1.24 | 1.80 |
| mean | 0.67 | 0.97 | 1.01 | 0.94 | 0.26 | 0.16 | - 0.04 | 6.19 |
| max | 16.42 | 3.88 | 7.40 | 4.89 | 2.00 | 2.26 | 1.08 | 24.82 |

Men only

| $\min$ | - | 7.27 | - | 1.04 | - | 3.24 | - | 2.35 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | - | 0.01 | - | 0.87 | - | 1.24 | 1.80 |  |
| $\max$ | 0.74 | 0.97 | 1.03 | 0.94 | 0.27 | 0.19 | - | 0.01 |
| 16.42 | 3.66 | 7.40 | 3.62 | 2.00 | 2.26 | 1.08 | 24.82 |  |

Women participation

| $\min$ | - | 3.56 | - | 0.14 | - | 0.72 | - | 0.36 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | 0.45 | 1.15 | 1.16 | 1.14 | 0.28 | - | 1.47 | - |
| ${ } }$ | 5.97 | 3.88 | 4.07 | 4.89 | 0.95 | - | 0.09 | 6.68 |

Unclassified

| $\min$ | - | 3.63 | - | 0.20 | - | 0.31 | - | 0.22 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | - | - | 0.51 | - | 1.15 | 2.15 |  |  |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | - | 0.15 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.91 | 0.25 | 0.23 | - |
| $\max$ | 4.56 | 1.61 | 1.82 | 2.26 | 0.66 | 0.68 | 0.54 | 11.89 |

Table Appendix 2.7.1: Discrete Annual Performance of IA UK All Companies
Annual Performance \& Number of Funds in Year

| All funds | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average performance | 19.27 | 14.29 | 8.64 | 3.14 | 19.41 | 7.86 | 1.79 | 14.24 | 30.38 | 0.30 |
| Number of funds | 199 | 208 | 213 | 218 | 224 | 230 | 233 | 239 | 242 | 247 |
| Men only | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 20.34 | 15.82 | 9.06 | 2.28 | 19.56 | 7.93 | 1.65 | 14.06 | 31.84 | 0.53 |
| Number of funds | 128 | 132 | 136 | 139 | 143 | 145 | 146 | 149 | 150 | 151 |
| Women participation | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 17.43 | 13.26 | 8.59 | 3.64 | 18.48 | 7.82 | 2.52 | 12.52 | 30.29 | 5.69 |
| Number of funds | 25 | 26 | 26 | 27 | 27 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 29 | 30 |
| Unclassified | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 17.28 | 10.79 | 7.54 | 5.18 | 19.48 | 7.69 | 1.80 | 15.45 | 26.93 | 4.92 |
| Number of funds | 46 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 54 | 57 | 59 | 62 | 63 | 66 |

Table Appendix 2.7.2: Descriptive Statistics for the 10-year Period of IA UK All Companies

Descriptive Statistics for 10 year Period to 2022:


Table Appendix 2.7.3: Risk Statistics for the 5-year Period of IA UK All Companies
Risk Statistics for 5 Year Period
Alpha, Beta, Sharpe, Sortino \& Information Ratios for min and max values
5 year

| All funds | 5 year Alpha | 5 year Beta | 5 year Bull Beta | 5 year Bear Beta | 5 year Sharpe | 5 year <br> Sortino | Info Ratio Rel. | 5 year Volatility |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| min | 8.25 | 0.50 | 0.36 | 0.18 | 0.01 | 0.23 | 1.04 | 11.16 |
| mean | 0.37 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 1.00 | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.02 | 16.37 |
| max | 10.55 | 1.58 | 1.72 | 1.83 | 0.90 | 0.81 | 1.41 | 27.85 |

Men only

| $\min$ | - | 8.25 | 0.50 | 0.36 | 0.18 | - | 0.01 | - |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | 0.39 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.03 | 0.23 | - | 1.04 | 11.72 |
| $\max$ | 10.44 | 1.45 | 1.72 | 1.65 | 0.90 | 0.18 | 0.03 | 16.74 |
|  |  |  |  | 1.41 | 23.89 |  |  |  |

Women participation

| $\min$ | - | 5.47 | 0.68 | 0.70 | 0.64 | - | 0.01 | - |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | - | 0.46 | 1.01 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.14 |  | 0.13 |
| $\max$ | 2.32 | 1.30 | 1.53 | 1.38 | 0.32 | 0.11 | 16.80 |  |

Unclassified

| $\min$ | - | 5.44 | 0.75 | 0.52 | 0.65 | - | 0.01 | - |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | 0.73 | 0.93 | 0.91 | 0.92 | 0.22 | 0.21 | - | 0.45 |
| $\max$ | 10.55 | 1.58 | 1.68 | 1.83 | 0.69 | 0.62 | 12.63 |  |
|  | 15.20 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table Appendix 2.8.1: Discrete Annual Performance of IA UK Equity Income
Annual Performance \& Number of Funds in Year

| All funds | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average performance | 21.52 | 14.99 | 8.97 | 2.46 | 16.47 | 5.29 | 0.38 | 16.55 | 26.62 | 6.60 |
| Number of funds | 69 | 71 | 71 | 72 | 75 | 78 | 81 | 83 | 83 | 85 |
| Men only | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 21.26 | 15.27 | 8.77 | 2.45 | 16.80 | 5.55 | 0.54 | 16.41 | 27.46 | 5.93 |
| Number of funds | 53 | 53 | 53 | 54 | 57 | 59 | 62 | 64 | 64 | 65 |
| Women participation | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 22.50 | 15.00 | 9.69 | 1.39 | 15.94 | 5.34 | 0.14 | 17.42 | 22.46 | 8.38 |
| Number of funds | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| Unclassified | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Average performance | 22.15 | 12.85 | 9.40 | 4.24 | 14.59 | 3.37 | 0.51 | 16.47 | 25.62 | 9.23 |
| Number of funds | 5 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 |

Table Appendix 2.8.2: Descriptive Statistics for the 10-year Period of IA UK Equity Income

Descriptive Statistics for 10 year Period to 2022:

|  | Mean | SD |  | Skew | Kurt | JarqueBera Test Statistic | $p$ value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| All funds | 8.18 | 12.61 |  | 0.51 | 0.37 | 1.75 | 41.74\% |
| Men only | 8.27 | 12.72 |  | 0.44 | 0.33 | 1.33 | 51.35\% |
| Women participation | 8.06 | 12.19 |  | 0.85 | 0.86 | 5.46 | 6.52\% |
| Unclassified | 7.60 | 12.57 |  | 0.47 | 0.15 | 1.38 | 50.06\% |

Table Appendix 2.8.3: Risk Statistics for the 5-year Period of IA UK Equity Income
Risk Statistics for 5 Year Period
Alpha, Beta, Sharpe, Sortino \& Information Ratios for min and max values
5 year
5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year Info Ratio 5 year
All funds

|  | 5 year <br> Alpha | $\begin{gathered} 5 \text { year } \\ \text { Beta } \end{gathered}$ | 5 year <br> Bull Beta | 5 year <br> Bear Beta | 5 year <br> Sharpe | 5 year <br> Sortino | Info Ratio Rel. | 5 year <br> Volatility |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| min | 10.27 | 0.64 | 0.51 | 0.61 | 0.01 | 0.42 | 1.40 | 11.59 |
| mean | 0.24 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.04 | 16.09 |
| max | 4.57 | 1.38 | 1.59 | 1.49 | 0.42 | 0.46 | 1.18 | 22.08 |

Men only

| $\min$ | -10.27 | 0.64 | 0.51 | 0.61 | - | 0.01 | - | 0.42 | - |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | - | 0.16 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 0.99 | 0.16 | 0.14 | - | 0.04 |
| $\max$ | 4.57 | 1.38 | 1.59 | 1.49 | 0.42 | 0.46 | 16.59 |  |  |

Women participation

| $\min$ | - | 3.35 | 0.84 | 0.70 | 0.88 | - | - | 0.04 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Unclassified

| $\min$ | - | 4.52 | 0.90 | 0.64 | 0.87 | - | - | 0.11 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: |
| - | 0.75 | 14.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\operatorname{mean}$ | - | 0.31 | 1.02 | 0.97 | 1.02 | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.01 |
| $\max$ | 2.25 | 1.20 | 1.28 | 1.30 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.54 | 19.37 |


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Assistant Professor in Finance \& Deputy Director of the Faculty Centre for Applied Finance and Banking at Regent's University London, CEO of Schmidt Research Partners Limited, and former Chief Economist at NLP Financial Management, London UK.
    ${ }^{2}$ Postgraduate Researcher, BA, Regent's University London, UK

